Robust PAC Learning of Concurrent Stochastic Games

Paper recorded by Signals 4 on 2026-09-03 in cs.LG. Abstract reproduced from arXiv; link to the original below.

Published 2026-09-03 on arXiv · recorded by Signals 4 on 2026-09-04

Category: cs.LG · 机器学习 · first seen 2026-09-04

Abstract

We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust

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