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Price of Anarchy of First-Price Auctions in Agentic Markets

Paper recorded by Signals 4 on 2026-10-14 in cs.AI. Abstract reproduced from arXiv; link to the original below.

Published 2026-10-14 on arXiv · recorded by Signals 4 on 2026-10-15

Category: cs.AI · 人工智能 · first seen 2026-10-15

Abstract

An agentic market is a decentralized serving-time market where AI agents bid to claim each user prompt. An agent's bid is based on its expected value for the prompt, which is the expectation of the reward for its response minus its inference costs. First-price auctions (FPAs), in which the highest bidder pays its bid and receives the prompt, are a natural way to allocate prompts in such a market,

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#305 most recent of 960 cs.AI papers we have recorded · ↑ newer: Your Transformer Is Secretly Elastic · ↓ older: Continuum Attention
Cite this page: Price of Anarchy of First-Price Auctions in Agentic Markets: the #305 most recent of 960 cs.AI papers we have recorded (as of 2026-10-14). Source: Signals 4 (Signals API) — https://data.jiangzhang.ca/signals4/t/papers/price-of-anarchy-of-first-price-auctions-in-agentic-markets.html
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