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Pre-Crime for Agents, at the Last Second: Probing When a Recruited Agent Gives In

Paper recorded by Signals 4 on 2026-10-29 in cs.AI. Abstract reproduced from arXiv; link to the original below.

Published 2026-10-29 on arXiv · recorded by Signals 4 on 2026-10-30

Category: cs.AI · 人工智能 · first seen 2026-10-30

Abstract

When AI agents share channels and credentials, one agent can press another to break its operator's rule, a first step towards collusion. Output filters check only what an agent has already written. Can an overseer tell beforehand that an agent is about to give in? We show that a linear probe on the agent's activations can, in a controlled multi-agent setting. Across six scenarios, a peer presses a

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#69 most recent of 920 cs.AI papers we have recorded · ↑ newer: Collaborative AI agents for autonomous experimental research with soli · ↓ older: Multistatic ISAC with Deep Learning-Based Clutter Suppression for 5G a
Cite this page: Pre-Crime for Agents, at the Last Second: Probing When a Recruited Agent Gives In: the #69 most recent of 920 cs.AI papers we have recorded (as of 2026-10-29). Source: Signals 4 (Signals API) — https://data.jiangzhang.ca/signals4/t/papers/pre-crime-for-agents-at-the-last-second-probing-when-a-recruited-agent-gives-in.html
Free to quote with attribution to “Signals 4 (Signals API)”. Machine-readable: papers.json
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